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ABSTRACT
Interest groups are omnipresent phenomena of most political societies. They are present because of their attempts to 
influence public policy and their representation role. These roles are fundamental agential roles. Through these roles 
interest groups can bring about changes in the water policy arena. This paper will look at some of these changes using the 
Lesotho Highlands Water Project Phase 1 as a case study. Through their actions to bring about change, interest groups 
are drivers of water politics. Interest groups can enhance water policies when they highlight the inherent deficiencies of 
policies and suggest alternatives for the betterment of policies concerning the welfare of individuals or groups as well as the 
environment. Water resource managers and decision-makers should therefore be aware of these actors and the roles they are 
likely to play when influencing aspects of water infrastructure projects. Interest groups can influence water policies even if 
they are only involved on an informal basis. In other words, governments do not have to go out of their way, so to speak, to 
involve interest groups; interest groups will come to the party, on their own volition. Said differently, interest groups usually 
become involved in water policy matters on a voluntary basis whether water policy makers like it or not.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper I investigate and report on the changes that inter-
est groups can institute in the implementation of water pro-
jects. I will use the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) 
Phase 1 (A and B) as a case study. Interest groups are omni-
present phenomena of many political systems because of their 
attempts to influence public policy and their representation 
role (Meissner, 2015) in society. The influencing of public policy 
and their related representation role are fundamental roles 
they play as agents of change. It is not impossible that all other 
roles interest groups play are based on, or are derived from, 
these roles. Interest groups are usually associated with the 
domestic political arena when engaging government over policy 
matters. Over the past two decades, they have become trans-
nationally involved in the South African water sector. It was 
not only interest groups from South Africa that have engaged 
governmental and parastatal institutions on matters pertain-
ing to the water sector; groups from around the globe have also 
participated. It is, therefore, important within the context of 
managing change in the South African water sector to ana-
lyse the transnational role and involvement of these actors in 
the water sector. Interest groups can bring about changes in 
the water policy arena with implications for the institutional 
management of water policy matters. Because of their presence 
and roles it is important that interest groups be recognised and 
analysed by researchers.
The main argument of this paper is that because inter-
est groups are omnipresent, they can be default stakeholders 
in certain water resource management issue areas. Interest 
groups furthermore have the ability and capability to insti-
tute change. In the first section, I outline the data-gathering 
approach followed while studying interest groups’ involvement 
in the LHWP Phase 1 (A and B). In the second part I define the 
concept ‘interest group’, while in the third I investigate inter-
est groups’ roles when articulating issues. How interest groups 
engage government is the subject of the fourth portion of the 
article. In the fifth segment, I discuss the role and involvement 
of interest groups in the LHWP. Finally, the reasons why water 
managers should take interest groups seriously is discussed. 
APPROACH
I followed the descriptive-analytical approach in analysing 
the roles interest groups played in Phase 1 (A and B) of the 
LHWP. The involvement of interest groups relates to transna-
tional politics where state boundaries are no longer applicable 
to the traditional image of international politics focusing on a 
reality constructed by states and their officials. The new reali-
ties concern the relations between state actors and non-state 
actors leading to a breakdown of traditional cross-border state 
relations (e.g. Rosenau, 1990). I gathered data mainly through 
a desktop study, investigating various websites of interest 
groups’ either directly or indirectly involved in lobbying 
issues pertaining to the LHWP. Field data sources consisted 
mainly of unstructured interviews with a number of leaders 
of interest groups. These interest groups included the Group 
for Environmental Monitoring (GEM), the Environmental 
Monitoring Group (EMG) and the Transformation Resource 
Centre (TRC). I also conducted interviews with officials from 
the then Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF), 
the Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority (TCTA) and the Lesotho 
Highlands Development Authority (LHDA). I also visited the 
project area in June 2004 and conducted face-to-face inter-
views with officials from the Lesotho Government, such as the 
Ombudsman and Attorney-General, as well as officials of the 
Lesotho Highlands Development Authority (LHDA). I also vis-
ited a number of the LHWP sites, such as the Mohale and Katse 
Dams, and did fieldwork in the country to ascertain living 
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conditions. I gathered the data for my Doctoral thesis with the 
title The Transnational Role and Involvement of Interest Groups 
in Water Politics: A Comparative Analysis of Selected Southern 
African Case Studies under the supervision of Prof Anton du 
Plessis at the University of Pretoria.
Interest groups and their roles
An interest group is a non-state entity that influences govern-
ment policies and other non-state institutions, in the national 
and international political domains (Wilson, 1990; Wright, 
1996). For the purposes of this study, I excluded private sector 
interest groups such as multi-national corporations that influ-
ence government, because they are mainly concerned with 
profit making, while the interest groups under discussion are 
not. In this paper my focus is on interest groups that are not 
interested in gaining a market share or creating a market for a 
product through lobbying government. The main objective of 
an interest group is to influence public policy or projects and 
programmes contained within a public policy arena. Interest 
groups are categorised into 5 types, each with its own charac-
teristics (Table 1).
Interest groups do not play their various roles simultane-
ously and constantly. The public policy process is dynamic, 
circular and complex, rather than linear and neatly com-
partmentalised, and has a number of intertwined processes. 
These are agenda setting, policy formulation, legitimation, 
organisation, implementation, evaluation, and policy termina-
tion (Hogwood and Peters, 1983; Booysen and Erasmus, 1998). 
Interest groups can be involved throughout this cyclical and 
complex progression. It is within this dynamism that interest 
groups start to become relevant actors in water politics. Interest 
groups will play certain roles within this arena and articulate 
some of the key issues contained within it or add new issues via 
their role-playing.
A ‘role’ means a contribution, or a fulfilled function; an 
influence or impact; anticipated behaviour based on certain 
rules; a course of action; a part in a larger script; a policy deci-
sion; a status, rank, or position in the political process. A role 
refers to the interest group’s own definition of types of deci-
sions, commitments, rules and actions to be taken, and of its 
functions in the international and domestic political system 
(Le Prestre, 1997). Said differently, there is not a single mean-
ing to the concept ‘role’; a role can be many things to a variety 
of individuals and/or groups. This multiple definition links 
strongly with the various roles interest groups can play in the 
public policy process.
Interest groups are participants, representatives, and 
influencing actors in the policy process. They participate as 
agents, affording them agential power. The lexical definition of 
an agent states that it is ‘one who or that which exerts power or 
produces an effect’ and ‘one who acts for another in business, 
politics, etc.’ (COD, 1982). Thus, interest groups play an agential 
role in society because they can produce an effect and/or repre-
sent others in politics through courses of action, contributions, 
fulfilled functions, or certain types of behaviour, and from a 
status, rank, or position in the policy process.
Interest group roles can be grouped together under three 
generic categories: discursive, participatory (how they engage 
government), and philanthropic roles (see Table 2).
TABLE 1
Interest group typology, adapted from Almond and Powell (1995); Heywood (1997); Sadie (1998); and Grant (2000)
Interest group type Characteristics
Anomic Spontaneous; based on strong emotions; unorganised; short-lived; unpredictable; uncontrollable and the tactics are 
sometimes illegitimate, e.g., riots
Communal Members know each other on a personal basis; membership is not required; and groups are established on a common 
origin, tradition or loyalty, e.g., ethnic groups, families, tribes, and castes
Non-associational Rarely well organised; activities are eventful; membership based on interests of region, religion, profession, kinship, 
ideology; and interests are articulated on an ad hoc basis, e.g., consumer groups
Associational Limited number of goals; represent the interests of a certain group of people in society; formal procedures for for-
mulating interests and demands; have an employed staff; a permanent character; institutionalised; and divided into 
promotional and sectional groups, e.g., Greenpeace
Institutional Formally organised; have other social functions; part of a governmental department; exercise influence through 
the governmental apparatus; and can be powerful because of insider status, e.g., a group of persons within the 
Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS)
TABLE 2
Interest group roles
Generic Discursive Participation Philanthropic
Agential roles within the broader 
generic categories
•	 Opinion generation agent
•	 Standard creation agent
•	 Norms creation agent
•	 Epistemic agent




•	 Policy-shaping (influencing) 
agent
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THE CASE OF THE LESOTHO HIGHLANDS WATER 
PROJECT PHASE 1
Phase 1 (A and B)
The LHWP is an inter-basin transfer scheme, jointly imple-
mented by Lesotho and South Africa, the purpose of which is to 
divert water from the upper reaches of the Orange-Senqu River 
in Lesotho to the Vaal River system, as well as hydroelectric 
generation for Lesotho. More than 90% of the construction 
work was located in Lesotho; the full construction process 
is divided into Phases 1 (A and B), 2, 3 and 4 (Horta, 1998; 
Meissner, 1998; Meissner, 2015). Phase 1 (A and B) is the only 
phase that has been completed. Phase 2 is currently under con-
struction, inaugurated by the two governments in 2014.
Phase 1A was designed to transfer 18 m3/s of water to South 
Africa and generate 72 MW of electricity. This phase consists of 
two large dams (Katse and Muela), the excavation of 82 km of 
subterranean water transfer tunnels and the construction of an 
underground hydroelectric power station (DWAF, 1994; Wallis, 
1996; DWAF, 2002).
Phase 1B consisted of the construction of two dams 
(Mohale and Matsoku), both connected to the Katse reservoir. 
It delivers water at a rate of 12 m³/s. In 2003 the project authori-
ties estimated that the LHWP will transfer an average of 871 
million m3/year through a network of 260 km of water delivery 
tunnels (DWAF, 1998; Mochebelele, 2000).
Actors and their interaction
Since the initiation of the LHWP in the mid-1980s, a number of 
actors have been involved in the hydropolitical dynamics of the 
project. These actors ranged from the Governments of Lesotho 
and South Africa, the respective governmental departments 
of water affairs, and the implementing authorities, as well as 
multinational corporations, contractors and interest groups.
The interest groups involved are from three geographical 
locations relative to the project or the Orange-Senqu River 
basin: the core (basin or project area), periphery (basin states 
Engaging government
Not only do interest groups play a plethora of roles, they also 
have a number of strategies and tactics at their disposal when 
engaging government. A strategy is defined as extensive lay-
outs of attack, or the miscellaneous approaches to lobbying. 
Tactics, on the other hand, are the particular actions taken 
to promote specific policy preferences (Berry, 1977). There is 
a link between strategies (approaches) and tactics with inter-
est groups usually employing different tactics within various 
approaches.
Four approaches are available to interest groups as engage-
ment or linkage strategies: the power approach; the techno-
cratic approach; the coalition-building approach; and grass-
roots mobilisation (see Table 3). The use of each approach will 
depend on the specific characteristics of the group and the 
domestic and international context of the situation in which 
they employ the approaches (Mingst, 1995). The resources 
a group holds, in terms of knowledge and finances, are also 
likely to influence the utilisation of the different approaches. 
For instance, an interest group that is embedded within a rural 
environment with little or no financial resources, is more likely 
to use its knowledge of the groups in that environment to mobi-
lise them at a grassroots level.
From the four approaches available to interest groups, 
it is evident that these non-state entities do not only resort 
to domestic approaches or tactics. They also use strate-
gies and tactics from outside a country’s borders. These 
are transnational approaches. Interest groups can engage 
government, regarding a policy issue, project or programme 
from anywhere across the globe. This is evident from their 
involvement in the LHWP. My research shows that it was 
not only interest groups from Lesotho and South Africa that 
attempted to inf luence the respective countries’ govern-
ments; groups from abroad were also involved. In the next 
section I will discuss how interest groups in LHWP Phase 1 
(A and B) played different roles, employed a variety of strate-
gies and tactics and engaged government through different 
approaches or means. 
TABLE 3
Strategies and tactics available to interest groups when engaging government  
(after Berry, 1977; Mingst, 1995; and Sadie, 1998)
Strategy Description Tactics
Power Approach Targeting top decision-makers in the domes-
tic and international arena, i.e., those with 
political power
1. Direct communication is used, i.e., personal presentations to govern-
ment and testifying before congressional or parliamentary committee
2. Influence the governmental process or any other organisation through 




Interest groups use their knowledge of pro-
cedural mechanisms as well as legal systems, 
which enables them to learn how the domestic 
and international systems function
1. Link the domestic and international systems
2. Caution others of negative policy trends
3. Intervene administratively in institutions
4. Litigation
5. Formation of an international forum to address policy issues
Coalition-building 
approach
Creation of transnational coalitions 1. Connecting issues
2. Perforation of social networks
3. Joining groups across national borders
Grass-root 
mobilisation
Build widespread involvement of the pub-
lic across the borders of a number of states 
simultaneously
1. Direct or controversial actions
2. Ideological enticement
3. Indirect communication, i.e., letter writing campaigns and campaign 
contributions for political parties
4. Advertisements in the printed and electronic media
5. Use of celebrities
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– but outside the basin – and the region within which the basin 
states are located, like SADC), and outer periphery (the rest of 
the world) (see Fig. 1) (Meissner, 2014).
Of the 40 actors involved in the hydropolitics of the LHWP, 
33 are interest groups, 4 states, and 3 functional organisations. 
This means that the interest groups outnumber the states by 
8.25:1 and the functional organisations by 11:1. From a ratio 
perspective, the power balance is tipped in favour of the interest 
groups on both fronts.
The interest groups were not only from South Africa and 
Lesotho but from other parts of the world. Most of these 
countries are liberal democracies, situated in the developed 
Northern Hemisphere (e.g. Canada, Germany, Italy, Norway, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States). 
Because of their liberal-democratic character it is the rule 
rather than the exception that interest groups from the outer 
periphery were involved. The liberal democratic ideology was 
therefore the constitutive element in determining which groups 
became involved and how they engaged the governments and 
the project authorities.
The base countries of the remainder of the interest groups 
are India, Lesotho and South Africa. The Indian interest groups 
(Save the Narmada Movement) became involved in lobbying 
against the LHWP because of the experience it had regarding 
the implementation of the Sardar Sarovar Dam in the Narmada 
River (Die Volksblad, 1998). Not all of the interest groups are 
directly involved in lobbying the state institutions on a con-
tinuous basis. Only 13 (most from Lesotho and South Africa) of 
the 33 groups are directly involved, an indication that the inter-
est groups’ constituencies are openly affected by the project, i.e. 
they are people living within the project area or basin that will 
either benefit or not benefit from the transfer of water from the 
mountain kingdom.
Interest group involvement
How and to what extent were interest groups involved in the 
hydropolitics of the LHWP? A concise history of their involve-
ment will shed light on this question.
From the conceptualisation of the LHWP by Ninham 
Shand in 1956, to the present, politicians and scholars have 
viewed the project as one of the main driving forces in the 
political relationship between Lesotho and South Africa 
(Shand, 1956; Young, 1961; Meissner, 1998; Meissner, 2004). 
The two states were the only political actors involved in the 
LHWP, or so everyone thought. Interest groups, articulating a 
number of issues, have also been involved in the hydropolitics 
of the project since its implementation in 1986 (Meissner, 2004; 
Meissner, 2015). Interest groups became involved in the project 
a year before the signing of the LHWP Treaty (Meissner, 1998; 
Meissner, 2005; Meissner, 2015) when, in 1985, the Mennonite 
Central Committee (MCC) a Canadian and United States–based 
interest group stationed two fieldworkers in the central project 
area to monitor the LHWP’s progress. On 24 October 1986, 
Lesotho and South Africa signed the LHWP Treaty. Two days 
before the signing, President Samora Machel of Mozambique 
died after his presidential plane crashed in South Africa. 
Students from the National University of Lesotho, believing that 
his death was a deliberate act on the part of the South African 
Government, reacted and staged a demonstration in Maseru. 
This demonstration was to coincide with, and disrupt, the sign-
ing of the treaty. Police intervened and the students failed to 
disrupt the signing (Khits’ane, 1997; Thabane, 2000; Meissner 
and Turton 2003). This is another indication of the type of 
transnationalisation linked to the project; a head of state from 
one of apartheid South Africa’s neighbours died in an incident 
unrelated to the LHWP Treaty signing ceremony and students 
protest in Lesotho. This indicates to what extent an anomic 
interest group can politicise a water management issue.
In April 1988 the Transformation Resource Centre (TRC), a 
Lesotho-based interest group, held a workshop at the request of 
the Heads of Churches of Lesotho. Part of the workshop dealt 
with the LHWP. Many of the participants had close contact 
with the communities affected by the project. The workshop 
discussed some of the socio-political, economic, and envi-
ronmental problems likely to impact the communities. The 
delegates elected a representative committee to draw up recom-
mendations with the communities. The Heads of Churches of 
Lesotho directed the recommendations and presented these to 
the Lesotho Government. A loose coalition of activists formed 
to deal with the issue of affected communities (Khits’ane, 
1997). The church in Lesotho (an NGO) was therefore the main 
catalyst in initially getting interest groups involved. Because of 
the church’s involvement, the role and involvement of interest 
groups deepened to include Lesotho’s ecclesiastical community. 
The church’s involvement also indicated the salience of moral 
or ethical concerns regarding the project.
From 1988 to the commissioning of Phase 1 in 2004, the 
number of interest groups involved grew from a few in Lesotho 
to a worldwide movement campaigning against the project or 
some of its components, or for change in the implementation 
of certain policies, like the compensation to villagers affected 
by components of the project. During this period the interest 
groups articulated a number of issues, ranging from the plight 
of workers on the construction sites to displaced persons in 
the project area. These issues were articulated in a number of 
forums, while targeting a number of state and other non-state 
actors. One of these forums was the World Commission on 
Dams (WCD) hearings, held on 11 and 12 November 1999 
in Cape Town. At the hearings, villagers from the area gave 
evidence about their experiences regarding the project’s imple-
mentation and how it impacted on their livelihoods (Stott et al., 
2000; Meissner, 2000; Meissner, 2004). The interest groups left 
no stone unturned in their lobbying. They used any means at 
their disposal and nearly all state and parastatal actors involved 
in the project were targeted. The interest groups held meet-
ings with World Bank officials and workshops and conferences 
on the LHWP and its impacts on communities, responded 
to labour unrest and other newsworthy events regarding the 
project (e.g. corruption), as well as recommendations to project 
Figure 1
The geographical location of the interest groups involved in the 
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authorities based on fieldtrips and surveys (Meissner, 2004). 
From 1996 to 1997 the Group for Environmental Monitoring 
(GEM) (a South African–based interest group) held a number 
of workshops and conferences to debate the issues regarding 
the LHWP. Officials from both governments, the World Bank, 
the Development Bank of Southern Africa and Rand Water 
attended these workshops and conferences. The backdrop to the 
workshops and conferences was a letter published in the Business 
Day by Richard Sherman from GEM. In this letter he reiterated 
the ‘grave concerns on ecological, social and economic grounds’ 
relating to the project. He also wrote that ‘[a] mountain of cor-
respondence testifies to the well informed and urgent debate 
over whether the people of Lesotho have been treated properly; 
whether the regional ecology can stand such unprecedented 
reversal of water flow; whether conservation measures can now 
be applied (given the huge inflow of Lesotho water that must 
now be paid for and hence consumed); and whether the many 
vastly underserved Gauteng consumers will ever receive their 
[reconstruction] and development programme promise of a free, 
lifeline supply [of water]’ (Sherman, 1998: 9). Sherman’s letter 
indicates that the interest groups did not only campaign against 
the LHWP on ecological grounds. The interest groups also 
invoked the issues of unequal water distribution and access to 
advance their arguments against the project.
When labour unrest broke out at the Mohale construction 
site in September 1996, interest groups argued that the unrest 
was the result of the unequal treatment of Basotho workers 
compared to those from other countries, police harassment of 
the workers, the dismantling of negotiating structures between 
the workers and contractors, and the beating of a worker who 
allegedly stole cement. The coalition of interest groups called 
on the World Bank to use its office to influence the Lesotho 
Government and the LHDA to take proper measures regard-
ing the labour unrest. According to Pottinger (1996) from 
International Rivers (a United States-based interest group),  
‘[a]t least five workers were shot dead and some 30 injured 
during the incident’. Environmental Defence, also from the 
USA, and the Environmental Monitoring Group from South 
Africa also voiced their concern (Meissner, 2004). Said dif-
ferently, a global development institution is lobbied by inter-
est groups from the United States (International Rivers and 
Environmental Defence) and South Africa (Environmental 
Monitoring Group) to intervene in the domestic politics of 
(another) developing African country. This lobbying effort is 
therefore a good example of the transnationality interest groups 
can bring to a bilateral international project.
Not only did the interest groups argue from an ecologi-
cal, economic and ethical point of view, they also raised moral 
concerns when corruption around the project surfaced. In 
November 1999, International Rivers and the Public Service 
International sent a letter to the then World Bank President, 
James Wolfensohn. In this letter they argued that the Bank 
‘bears responsibility here [LHWP], since it is the sponsor of 
large and profitable projects which attract multinationals. 
The Bank has adopted clauses in its procurement guidelines, 
which state that it will declare a company ineligible for future 
contracts if it has engaged in corrupt practices’ (IRN, 1999). 
They also impressed on the Bank to act against the companies 
implicated in the corruption scandal saying that it has a moral 
obligation to take action against the companies (IRN, 1999). 
This indicates that interest groups with a vested interest in a 
project will use any incident of concern regarding the project to 
target an actor (i.e. the World Bank) that can directly be linked 
to the project to apply pressure on the actor to act against those 
involved in the project.
During their lobbying efforts the interest groups made rec-
ommendations and gave alternatives to the project authorities. 
These recommendations and alternatives were often based on 
scientific studies conducted by the interest groups. For instance, 
two days before the commissioning of Phase 1A, in January 
1998, the Lesotho-based Highland Church Action Group 
released a report on a survey conducted in the project area. The 
report concluded that 75% of the Highland villagers affected by 
the LHWP believed that their standard of living had decreased 
since the start of the project. The report also indicated that 
40% of the 93 households surveyed claimed their grievances 
and compensation claims had not been addressed, with only 
two households satisfied with the compensation. Based on the 
report the interest group commented that: ‘The inaction on the 
cases shows, at best, a lack of co-ordination and organisation 
within the [LHDA] bureaucracy. At worst, it demonstrates a 
lack of respect for affected people as well as a lack of co-opera-
tion with non-government organisations’ (The Star, 21 January 
1998: 5; Business Day, 19 March 1998; Meissner, 2004: 259). The 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) reacted 
through Willie Croucamp, Director of International Projects, 
when he said that he was satisfied that compensation was 
adequately addressed by the LHDA. The World Bank had set 
in place compensation milestones for the LHDA, which were 
successfully met. Croucamp said that: ‘There has been satisfac-
tory progress for the World Bank to go ahead [partially funding 
Phase 1B], I think that is the best evidence that the LHDA has 
got behind some of the problems that have been plaguing the 
project’ (The Star, 21 January 1998: 5; Meissner, 2004: 259).
In November 1996, Christian Aid and Oxfam, the 
Highland Church Action Group and the Christian Council 
of Lesotho paid a visit to the LHWP, the purpose of which 
was to investigate the compensation programmes. After their 
visit, the interest groups met with a number of Lesotho and 
South African Government officials in Maseru, Pretoria and 
Johannesburg. The report of their visit contained a number 
of recommendations and alternatives, such as that the LHDA 
should strengthen its capacity to manage complex issues of 
social policy, by appointing expert staff to senior posts in the 
organisation. Another recommendation was that compensa-
tion of loss of income should also cover the loss of income 
from the sale of dagga (marijuana) and not only income from 
conventional agricultural enterprises. The interest groups also 
welcomed the LHDA’s policy to support work on social issues 
in the project area. The interest groups nevertheless indicated 
that the government, project authorities and non-governmental 
organisations should publicise information about health and 
social problems that are likely to occur during Phase 1B and 
encourage public discussion on the matter (Archer, 1996). As 
mentioned previously, the interest groups did not leave any 
stone unturned in their efforts to influence outcomes; they even 
asked that the loss of production of a narcotic (marijuana) be 
compensated.
Despite these efforts, the last component of Phase 1B, 
Mohale Dam, was completed in January 2003 (Business Day, 
24 January 2003). The interest groups were therefore unable to 
halt the construction of the entire project. This does not mean, 
however, that they were unable to effect change.
Characteristics of change
The interest groups were responsible for a number of changes. 
These changes were either broad-based (within the overall 
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South African and Lesotho water sectors) or specific (con-
cerning the LHWP itself). The role and involvement of inter-
est groups in the LHWP were unprecedented. Before the 
implementation of the LHWP, DWAF generally went about 
its business in an undisturbed manner. Many projects were 
implemented without the interference of interest groups (e.g. 
Meissner, 2003). This is clearly not the case with the LHWP. 
In other words, it was no longer a matter of ‘business as usual’ 
for DWAF. This change was therefore broad-based in that a 
governmental department had to contend with interest group 
involvement at an increasing rate.
No longer was it only government departments, contrac-
tors, and sub-contractors that were involved in the implementa-
tion of the project. Interest groups also started to take an inter-
est in the project. Civil society participation therefore became 
more pronounced. There was therefore a shift regarding the 
implementation of water projects in the South African water 
sector, commencing with the participation of interest groups 
in the LHWP. The interest groups therefore constituted a more 
complex and rapidly changing policy environment (Heinz et 
al., 1993) to which policy makers had to adapt. Related to this 
and along with a change in the actor dimension, the hydropo-
litical environment changed accordingly. No longer was the 
interaction between the governments of two states, financial 
institutions, and various multinational corporations imple-
menting certain parts of the project. The involvement of inter-
est groups brought about a widening of the interactive network 
between the state and the non-state actor community.
One of the most important and far-reaching changes was 
the discursive modification regarding the LHWP. Knowledge 
and power are inextricably linked. The one produces the other. 
An entity or individual extends power through the develop-
ment of new types of knowledge, which is used to collect more 
information about something and to exercise more control 
over this ‘something’. This process involves the development 
of discourses. Discourses are ways of talking about things and 
determine what they are, which have consequences of power 
(Foucault, 1979; Haralambos and Holborn, 2000).
A shift in the discourse took place when interest groups 
started to get involved in the project and criticised aspects 
thereof. No longer were water projects seen as good in that 
they provided more water to a growing society. Interest groups 
started to question the LHWP’s viability to society, voiced 
concern about the project’s negative impacts and even proposed 
an alternative policy initiative – water demand management. 
The practice of water demand management is firmly embed-
ded in the context of integrated water resource management 
(Schoeman, 2003). Interest groups promote water demand 
management as an alternative to water supply management 
projects like the LHWP. Interest group involvement meant 
that many citizens started to ‘arm’ themselves with alternative 
knowledge (discourses) and became, to a certain extent, more 
powerful. Before, they took in the knowledge that governments 
and project planners and managers provided. In the contempo-
rary age, citizens are more likely to question the intentions and 
policies of governments regarding water projects and interest 
groups are partly responsible for this increase in a questioning 
discourse.
Regarding this shift, Richardson (2000: 1021) states that: 
Whilst not always a threat, ideas and 
knowledge can have a virus-like quality and 
present a very real challenge to those stake-
holders who have relied on the security of 
cocoon-like policy communities. Ideas, like 
viruses, tend to be destabilizing agents and 
demand much skill on the part of existing 
players, if these players are to retain their 
existing benefits. In practice the new ideas 
and their attendant policy frames often 
‘capture’ all stakeholders who then find 
themselves adjusting to a new set of rules 
and power distributions quite different from 
the old policy regimes.
Thus, interest groups are part of the policy process via their dis-
cursive or norm-creating ability. The characteristics of change 
surrounding the LHWP can be summarised as follows: tempo-
ral, agential, political and discursive.
Noticing interest groups for what they are
Interest groups are agents within society, with a certain amount 
of agential power (Hobson, 2000) to effect policy changes. 
Although these agents could not stop the implementation of 
the LHWP, and the state’s agential power prevailed to a certain 
extent, interest groups are part of the policy process, in other 
words, they are part of integrated water resource management.
Regarding integrated water resource management, Tapela 
(2002) is of the opinion that policy-makers and decision-
makers see this type of management as facilitating the achieve-
ment of a balance between water resource use and protection, 
and the resolution of water-related conflicts. Jønch-Clausen 
and Fugl (2001) define IWRM as ‘…a process which promotes 
the co-ordinated development and management of water, 
land and related resources, in order to maximize the result-
ant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner 
without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems.’ 
The African Development Bank (ADB), moreover, describes 
integrated water resource management as a ‘comprehensive 
approach to water resource management that views water as a 
single resource with competing uses and inter linkages with the 
ecological, social and economic systems’ (see Fig. 2). Regarding 
this, integrated water resource management is an objective goal 
(ADB, 2000). These definitions of IWRM indicate that it has 
a holistic, encompassing, procedural, discursive, and interde-
pendent character.
Figure 2
IWRM’s conceptual framework (ADB, 2000)
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Interest groups with their role and involvement in water 
projects fit neatly into the integrated water resource manage-
ment process. Their main roles (influencing public policy 
and representation) can have an impact on the institutional 
framework and technical infrastructure of project implementa-
tion. The institutional framework and technical infrastructure 
supply the enabling facilities for water resource management. 
‘To function properly, the technical infrastructure requires 
an institutional framework to manage it. This includes insti-
tutional rules and legislation’ (ADB, 2000). Interest groups 
question the implementation of technical infrastructure, and 
demand alternatives through water demand management.
Interest groups can also represent the interests of the ‘basic 
needs’ sectors. For instance, they can uphold the interests of the 
environment when lobbying against water projects. Through 
their influencing role, they can also question the allocation of 
water throughout society and the ‘basic needs’ sectors (ADB, 
2000).
Interest groups were neatly located within the social system 
on which integrated water resource management rests, and 
interacted, within this system, with other actors, most notably 
government. Depending on the issue articulated they could 
also be located in the environmental (e.g. environmental inter-
est groups) and economic (e.g. consumer interest groups) sec-
tors. They will then argue for or against a project from one or 
more of these spheres. Because of their agential ability to affect 
change, interest groups are important stakeholders who are 
constantly involved in integrated water resource management. 
Practitioners should therefore take interest groups seriously.
CONCLUSION
The fact that more interest groups became involved in the 
hydropolitics of the LHWP means that the project has been 
transnationalised. It has also raised the level of democratisa-
tion regarding the project. More people had a say through the 
mouthpiece of interest groups, and more people came into 
contact with the project authorities through these non-state 
actors, than would have been the case if interest groups were 
not involved.
Thus, interest groups are part and parcel of IWRM 
although they are sometimes unable to affect concrete changes 
regarding a policy direction or the elimination of a programme 
or project. Nonetheless, depending on a number of aspects 
they have a certain amount of agential power. These non-state 
entities are also an integral part of the policy implementa-
tion process regarding water resources management. What is 
significant in their involvement is that they become involved on 
a voluntary basis, unlike, for example, catchment management 
agencies (CMAs), which are now mandated by South African 
legislation. It is highly probable that, in future, interest groups 
will play a significant role within the CMA process for interest 
group activity begets more interest group activity. This might 
change their behaviour because they will find themselves inside 
a different policy arena to the large dams’ debate. This will 
afford them a chance to have insider status in policy formula-
tion and the setting of agendas in the body politic of South 
Africa’s river basins. It might also create more uncertainty in 
the policy process because of the increasing number of stake-
holders in the process. Interest groups, as part of civil society, 
are therefore one of the main drivers of hydropolitics.
Interest groups are involved in the LHWP, not just for the 
sake of opposing the project. The roles interest groups played 
during their involvement is an indication that citizens (from 
South Africa and Lesotho) have organised to enlarge their 
influence in the policy process, to influence their governments 
and the project authorities to be more responsive and account-
able to their needs, and to demand an expanded role in gov-
ernance. The interest group network played a number of roles 
(Table 4) during the implementation of Phase 1 (A and B) of the 
LHWP.
Not all of the individual interest groups played all the roles 
simultaneously throughout the campaign against the LHWP. 
All were to a greater or lesser extent oppositional while the 
interest groups from the inner and outer periphery played the 
role of assistant agents, more so than the interest groups from 
the core. Thus, geographic location influences the identity of 
the interest group, which in turn impacts on the agential role 
it is likely to play. The type of interest group will also influ-
ence its agential role. Through these roles, interest groups are 
part of the IWRM process. This is mainly due to their ability 
to be policy shaping (influencing), representative, and trans-
national agents. They have the ability to create networks over 
great distances and across natural divides. By doing so, interest 
groups can mount a campaign against any policy or project 
anywhere in the world, and become an integral part thereof. It 
is up to decision-makers and policy and project managers to be 
aware of these non-state actors, identify those that will have the 
TABLE 4
The roles the interest group network played during their involvement in the LHWP
Discursive Role played  (Yes/No) Participation
Role played  
(Yes/No) Philanthropic




Yes Interactive agent Yes Guardian agent Yes
Standard creation 
agent
Yes Representation agent Yes Assistant agent Yes
Norms creation agent Yes Transnational agent Yes Safety provider agent Yes
Epistemic agent Yes Policy-shaping 
(Influencing) agent
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greatest influence on the policy or project implementation pro-
cess, and engage them in a meaningful and democratic manner.
The most important consideration practitioners should 
take into account is that interest groups will always be part of 
the policy process. Significantly, though, citizens will question 
a government or authority’s policy intentions, for the citizen 
is becoming more independent from government regarding 
his/her knowledge system and is more knowledgeable about 
issues and aspects than was the case a few decades ago. It is in 
the domain of policy intentions where interest groups have the 
greatest impact. These give citizens, whether from their own 
constituency or a society thousands of miles away, an alterna-
tive perspective on policy and project issues, and water sector 
planners and managers are well advised to consider their role 
and involvement in water policy matters.
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